• Zimbabwe posted its fifth consecutive trade surplus in February, the best streak in the country's trade history, though the surplus narrowed sharply by 57.7% as imports tripled
• Gold, which accounts for 45.7% of all export earnings, contracted 6.4% to US$461.43 million, while 80.7% of total export earnings flow exclusively through the UAE and China
• Zimbabwe's food and energy import bill is accelerating on multiple fronts simultaneously,  maize surged 48.3%, wheat more than tripled

Harare- Zimbabwe's merchandise trade recorded a surplus of US$46.5 million in February 2026, according to the latest trade data, marking the fifth straight surplus, the best performance in Zimbabwe’s trade.  However, the surplus narrowed from January’s US$109.9 million by US$63.4 million, a 57.7% decline, driven by a 12% surge in imports to US$963.1 million against export growth of only 4.1% to US$1.01 billion.

Imports grew at three times the rate of exports in a single month and if that divergence continues into March and April, and the fuel price increases of 18 March 2026, which pushed diesel to US$2.05 per litre and petrol to US$2.17, will add directly to the import fuel bill that already represents 18.3% of total imports, the trade surplus that Zimbabwe has been defending as evidence of external account stability faces structural pressure from both sides simultaneously.

The export data contains a signal that the aggregate 4.1% growth rate obscures. Gold, the dominant earner, fell from US$492.97 million in January to US$461.43 million in February, a US$31.5 million contraction, or 6.4%, in a single month. This is the commodity that accounts for 45.7% of all export earnings and the one that flows almost entirely through Dubai.

Its decline in February, before the March Gulf strikes, is analytically significant. It means the gold channel was already softening in price terms before the geopolitical shock that has since placed Dubai's logistics and financial infrastructure under direct regional pressure. Gold deliveries in February to Fidelity increased to 3.4 tonnes from 3 tonnes, but prices fluctuated across the month.

Tobacco moved in the opposite direction, rising from US$235.28 million in January to US$277.63 million in February, a US$42.35 million increase, or 18%. This is the auction season dynamic, Zimbabwe's tobacco marketing season typically runs from March through to August, but early deliveries and carry-forward inventory sales can produce monthly fluctuations of this magnitude.

The February tobacco performance partially offset the gold contraction and is what kept total export growth at 4.1%. Without the tobacco surge, the export line would have been flat or negative.

The number that demands the most attention in the February export data, however, is other mineral substances, which jumped from US$23.53 million in January to US$90.66 million in February, a US$67.13 million increase in a single month, representing a 185% surge. A category nearly quadrupling its value in 30 days is not a seasonal pattern. It is either a one-off large shipment, a reclassification of goods that were previously captured elsewhere, or the emergence of a new export stream that has not yet been fully explained in the public data.

Regardless of the underlying cause, a US$90.66 million contribution from a category that generated less than US$24 million a month prior is not a stable base for export income projections. If March's data shows other mineral substances reverting toward January levels, total exports will face simultaneous pressure from that reversal and from any further softening in gold.

Nickel ores and concentrates grew from US$30.66 million to US$38.24 million, a 24.7% increase that reflects the continued output from Zimbabwe's nickel operations and the sustained demand from Chinese processors who dominate the AfCFTA and SADC export flows for this commodity. Ferro-chromium rose from US$13 million to US$21 million, a 61.5% increase that mirrors the broader trend of Southern African chrome beneficiation feeding into Chinese and European stainless steel supply chains.

Both categories are growing and both flow into markets, primarily China and regional Africa, that are less directly exposed to the Gulf conflict than the UAE gold channel.

In a structurally diversified export economy, expanding nickel and ferro-chromium revenues would represent a meaningful risk offset. In Zimbabwe's current export structure, where gold and tobacco alone represent 73.2% of earnings, the combined US$59.24 million from nickel and ferro-chromium remains a secondary signal rather than a structural counterweight.

On imports, the import surge is concentrated in categories that are structurally non-discretionary. At the commodity level, the February import data reveals a pattern that goes beyond the headline 12% increase and identifies where the structural cost pressures are building most rapidly.

Diesel declined marginally from US$94.8 million in January to US$92.68 million in February, a US$2.12 million reduction that reflects either slightly lower volumes or a modest price movement in that specific month. This decline is the last data point before the ZERA adjustment of 18 March 2026, which pushed diesel to US$2.05 per litre from US$1.77,  a 15.8% price increase. The February diesel import figure will therefore be the last relatively stable baseline before a structural step-up in fuel import costs begins registering in the monthly data.

Unleaded petrol followed a similar pattern, declining from US$51.24 million to US$43.54 million in February, again before the post-ZERA petrol price moved from US$1.71 to US$2.17, a 26.9% increase. The combined fuel import bill across diesel and petrol of US$136.22 million in February will, on current price trajectories and assuming stable volumes, move materially higher in March and April.

Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons added a further US$10 million to the energy import bill in February, down from US$12 million in January. The modest month-on-month decline provides limited comfort given the Gulf supply disruption that has since occurred. Gaseous hydrocarbons, used in industrial processes, power generation backup, and commercial applications, are sourced through the same Gulf and regional supply chains that are now under pressure from the March strikes.

Electricity imports rose from US$10.9 million to US$12.1 million, a US$1.2 million increase that reflects Zimbabwe's continued dependence on regional power grid imports to supplement domestic generation shortfalls at Kariba and Hwange. Taken together, diesel, petrol, petroleum gases, and electricity represent a combined energy import bill of approximately US$158.32 million in February, a figure that is structurally exposed to Gulf pricing dynamics, regional power market conditions, and the domestic cost pass-through that the ZERA adjustment has since initiated.

What offsets the pre-March fuel moderation is the acceleration in food import costs. Maize imports rose from US$30.28 million in January to US$44.93 million in February, a US$14.65 million increase or 48.3% in a single month. Wheat imports more than tripled, rising from US$4.83 million to US$14.58 million, a US$9.75 million surge.

Together, maize and wheat accounted for US$59.51 million of February imports, compared to US$35.11 million in January, a combined monthly increase of US$24.4 million in cereal import costs in a single month. This is not a temporary procurement spike. It reflects the structural food import dependency that has persisted from the El Niño drought and that shows no sign of abatement.

Zimbabwe's domestic cereal production has not recovered to levels that would materially reduce the monthly import requirement, and, the food import bill is unlikely to compress significantly in the near term.

Soybeans, whether or not broken declined modestly from US$16.31 million to US$13.87 million, and crude soyabean oil fell from US$17.45 million to US$15.33 million. The soy complex as a whole, beans and oil combined, therefore consumed US$29.2 million of February's import bill, down slightly from US$33.76 million in January. That marginal reduction, however, is entirely absorbed by the maize and wheat increases.

Together, the broader food import basket across maize, wheat, soybeans, and soyabean oil reached US$88.71 million in February, compared to US$78.64 million in January, a US$10.07 million increase in a single month, and a monthly food import burden that is now approaching US$90 million with no structural relief in sight given the state of domestic agricultural production.

The food import dependency is not a short-term crisis expenditure. It is a recurring structural cost that competes directly with capital goods and fuel imports for the same pool of foreign currency, and that will not be resolved without a sustained recovery in domestic agricultural production that has not yet materialised at scale. At February run rates, maize and wheat alone cost US$59.51 million per month, equivalent to approximately 12.9% of total monthly export earnings. Annualised, those two line items alone imply over US$714 million in cereal import costs, roughly 70% of what Zimbabwe earns from all exports in a single month.

Crushing and grinding machines jumped from US$6.25 million to US$16.76 million, a US$10.51 million increase or 168%. Self-propelled bulldozers doubled from US$6.8 million to US$12.4 million. Together these two heavy equipment categories reached US$29.16 million in February against US$13.05 million in January, a combined increase of US$16.11 million in a single month.

Capital equipment of this nature, processing and milling machinery alongside earth-moving equipment, reflects investment in domestic productive capacity across agro-processing, minerals beneficiation, and infrastructure development. The bulldozer surge in particular is consistent with activity in the mining and construction sectors, where ground preparation and site development precede the export production gains that will eventually show up on the revenue side of the trade account. In isolation, these are positive indicators of industrial and extractive investment. In context, they contribute to an import bill that is growing at three times the rate of exports, and capital equipment imports, unlike food and fuel, are at least partially discretionary in their timing.

The intersection of rising food costs, imminent fuel cost step-ups, and the capital equipment cycle creates an import bill that is pulling in more foreign currency than the export economy is generating in incremental earnings.

The most analytically significant number in Zimbabwe's February 2026 trade data is not the surplus, it is the destination of the exports that produced it. The UAE received 46.4% of all Zimbabwean export earnings in February 2026. China received 34.3%. South Africa, the third largest destination, accounted for just 9.8%. The remaining 9.5% was distributed across Indonesia, Zambia, Mozambique, Belgium, and all other markets combined.

An economy in which two countries absorb more than 80% of total export revenue is not diversified. It is structurally dependent on the continued willingness and operational capacity of two specific buyers to receive its goods at current volumes and prices. Any disruption to either, a trade policy change, a demand contraction, a logistics interruption, or a geopolitical event, propagates directly and immediately into Zimbabwe's foreign currency earnings, its balance of payments position, and its ability to fund the US$963 million monthly import bill that keeps the economy running.

The UAE's 46.4% share is a gold routing story. Semi-manufactured gold accounts for 45.7% of all Zimbabwean exports, and the UAE, specifically Dubai,  functions as the primary refining and trading hub through which African gold enters global commodity markets. Zimbabwe's gold, processed through Fidelity Gold Refinery and exported as semi-manufactured gold, passes through Dubai on its way to final buyers in Europe, Asia, and North America.

The UAE is therefore both a genuine buyer and a transit intermediary, and its share of Zimbabwe's exports moves in direct proportion to gold production volumes and global gold prices. The fact that gold already contracted from US$492.97 million to US$461.43 million in February, before the March Gulf strikes, means the channel was weakening before the shock arrived. The UAE's 46.4% and gold's 45.7% are the same trade flow described from two different angles. A disruption to Dubai's gold trading infrastructure, its financial system connectivity, or its logistics capacity hits both simultaneously, and hits an export line that was already declining.

The geopolitical risk embedded in Zimbabwe's trade concentration is not a hypothetical scenario at the time of writing. On 9 March 2026, Iranian missile and drone strikes targeted energy infrastructure across Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman, disrupting regional supply chains and energy storage facilities across the Gulf. This is precisely the geography through which 46.4% of Zimbabwe's export earnings flow and from which a meaningful portion of its fuel imports originate.

The February 2026 trade data itself provides a further signal: Bahrain appears as Zimbabwe's third largest import source at 8.7% of total imports. Bahrain's 8.7% share of Zimbabwe's imports most likely reflects refined petroleum products, a reading consistent with the diesel and unleaded petrol figures that together represented US$136.22 million of February's import bill.

The appearance of Bahrain at 8.7% of imports in the same month that its energy infrastructure came under direct attack is not coincidental. It identifies the precise node in the supply chain where Middle East conflict risk translates into a Zimbabwean import cost problem.

Zimbabwe's fuel import bill represents the domestic economy's direct exposure to Gulf energy market pricing. At US$2.05 per litre for diesel and US$2.17 for petrol post the March ZERA adjustment, the country is already absorbing the first wave of Middle East conflict-related price transmission.

The question that the February trade data raises, and that the March and April trade releases will begin to answer, is whether the Gulf disruption deepens sufficiently to push fuel import costs materially higher, and whether the gold export channel through Dubai remains operationally intact at current throughput volumes if the UAE's financial and logistics infrastructure comes under sustained regional pressure.

Either scenario tightens the trade balance further. Both scenarios occurring simultaneously would reverse the surplus entirely.

Commodity Concentration and the Structural Export Problem

Gold at US$461.43 million and tobacco at US$277.63 million together account for US$739.06 million, 73.2% of Zimbabwe's total export earnings in February 2026. The remaining 26.8% is distributed across other mineral substances at US$90.66 million (though at a level that is likely anomalous), nickel ores at US$38.24 million, ferro-chromium at US$21 million, industrial diamonds at approximately US$20 million, and a long tail of smaller categories.

Zimbabwe's export economy is, in structural terms, a two-commodity story with a mineral tail. Gold's February contraction of US$31.5 million is partially illustrative of how much damage a single commodity's monthly variation can inflict on the overall trade position. If gold had held at January's US$492.97 million rather than falling to US$461.43 million, the trade surplus would have been approximately US$78 million rather than US$46.5 million. One commodity's US$31.5 million monthly movement is the difference between a surplus that communicates stability and a surplus that raises structural questions.

The regional export data provides a more nuanced picture of where Zimbabwe's secondary minerals go. Within SADC exports of US$130.6 million, nickel ores and concentrates dominate at 28.3%, with coke and semi-coke of coal at 11.7% and industrial diamonds at 10.1%. The EU export basket of US$14.7 million is led by tobacco at 38.2%, industrial diamonds at 28.1%, and ferro-chromium at 12.8%.

AfCFTA exports of US$134.7 million are led by nickel ores at 27.4% and coke at 11.4%. The regional and bilateral breakdowns reveal that Zimbabwe's chrome, nickel, coal, and diamond exports are predominantly absorbed within the African continent and in smaller quantities by European buyers, while the UAE and China overwhelmingly dominate gold and bulk mineral flows.

The regional export base is therefore more diversified in product terms than the aggregate basket suggests, but it is also significantly smaller in value terms. The US$134.7 million flowing to AfCFTA markets compares against roughly US$468 million going to the UAE alone.

Meanwhile, South Africa dominates Zimbabwe's import sources with a 35.2% share, reflecting the deep integration between the two economies across manufactured goods, food, machinery, and consumer products. China supplies 22.4% of imports, consistent with its position as Zimbabwe's primary source of capital goods, machinery, and electrical equipment, the crushing and grinding machine surge from US$6.25 million to US$16.76 million is likely sourced substantially from Chinese manufacturers.

Bahrain at 8.7% and the Bahamas at 3.8% are the import partners that warrant the most analytical attention given current geopolitical developments. Bahrain's 8.7%, cross-referenced with the diesel and unleaded petrol import values of US$92.68 million and US$43.54 million respectively, points directly to refined petroleum product flows that have since been disrupted by the March strikes on Bahraini energy infrastructure.

Outlook

The February 2026 trade data is a snapshot of Zimbabwe's trade position before the March 2026 fuel price increases, before the full import cost transmission from the Middle East conflict, and before the inflation trajectory that the MPC has projected through April and May begins to manifest in import volumes and prices. The March trade release will be the first data point that captures the fuel price impact directly.

Diesel at US$2.05 per litre versus the previous US$1.77 represents a 15.8% increase in the primary energy input cost for the transport, mining, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors that drive both export production and import logistics. Petrol at US$2.17 versus US$1.71 is a 26.9% increase. Both increases flow into the import fuel bill and into the domestic cost of producing the exports that pay for it.

Three dynamics will determine whether the March trade data shows a surplus at all. First, whether gold recovers from its February contraction or continues declining under the combined pressure of Dubai logistics disruption and any price softening. Second, whether the other mineral substances category, which surged anomalously by 185% in February, normalises downward, removing a US$67 million contribution that may not recur. Third, whether the fuel import bill step-up from the ZERA price adjustment, combined with the continued acceleration in maize and wheat import costs, pushes total import spending materially above the February US$963.1 million baseline.

Any two of these three dynamics moving adversely simultaneously would likely eliminate the surplus. All three moving adversely would produce a deficit,  the first in recent monthly trade data.

The structural picture that emerges from February's trade data is of an economy with a thin and narrowing trade surplus, a critically concentrated export base where the dominant earner was already declining before a geopolitical shock arrived at its primary trading hub, an import bill driven by non-discretionary food and energy requirements that are accelerating in cost faster than exports are growing, and a commodity-level picture in which the only items growing strongly on the export side, other mineral substances, ferro-chromium, nickel,  are too small to compensate for movements in gold. The surplus of US$46.5 million exists and is real. The trajectory toward it, the commodity movements within it, and the structural conditions surrounding it are what the monthly headline does not communicate.

February's data says the margin is thinning. The commodity detail says the sources of pressure are multiple and concurrent. March's data will say by how much.

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